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Abstract  
 
The study examines the effect of software piracy on inclusive human development in 11 
African countries for which software piracy data is available for the period 2000-2010. The 
empirical evidence is based on instrumental variable panel Fixed Effects (FE) and Tobit 
models in order to control for the unobserved heterogeneity and limited range in the 
dependent variable. The modeling exercise is based on the inequality adjusted human 
development (IHDI) and its constituents. The following main findings are established.  First, 
from the FE regressions, software piracy consistently improves the IHDI and its constituents. 
Within this framework, the positive relationship between inclusive human development and 
software piracy is driven by all its constituents.  Second, for Tobit regressions,  the positive 
relationship between software piracy and inclusive human development is confirmed 
exclusively in the IHDI and literacy specifications. Within the latter framework, the positive 
relationship between software piracy and inclusive human is driven fundamentally by the 
literacy rate. Policy implications are discussed.  
 
 
JEL Classification: K42; O34; O38; O47; O57 
Keywords: Software piracy; Human development; Intellectual property rights; Panel data, 
Instrumental variables. 
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1. Introduction  
 In recent years, there has been a wide consensus on the key role that Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) protection play on promoting innovation processes and economic 
growth. Recent technological advancements have not only resulted in an increased availability 
of information and technology related products but also in the proliferation of technology 
used to copy or pirate such goods (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a). Thus, efforts are being placed 
on increasing and harmonizing the standards and enforcement of IPRs protection worldwide 
(Asongu, 2013a). Since the concern of solidifying IPRs and curtailing the proliferation of 
pirated goods is particularly pronounced in developing countries, the concern over how this 
will affect economic growth has been widely debated.  
 While some scholars postulate that increased protection of IPRs stimulates economic 
growth and development via the positive impact on factor productivity (see for example, 
Gould & Gruben, 1996; Falvey et al., 2006; Ramello, 2005), some skeptics are of the stance 
that IPRs protection and adherence to international treaties (laws) may impede, rather than 
encourage economic growth in developing countries (Ramello, 2011; Nicita & Ramello, 2007 
)
1
. A great chunk of the opposition to stronger IPRs asserts that because the existing 
technology in developing countries is more imitative and/or adaptive in nature (rather than 
suitable for creation of new innovations) developing countries will be greatly hampered by 
such changes in policy  (Asongu, 2014a, p. 527). Moreover, it is disputed that weaker IPRs 
are necessary (at least on a temporal basis) for developing countries to obtain knowledge 
spillovers essential for growth and development (Asongu, 2014a, p. 527 ).  
 In light of the current debate, there is growing importance in the impact of IPRs 
protection on technological advancements, promotion of innovation and economic 
development. Still, whereas the theoretical literature has attempted to tackle this concern, little 
scholarly attention has been paid to the empirical literature.  Accordingly, the bulk of 
empirical studies have examined the socio-economic determinants of piracy in several 
copyright industries (Andrés, 2006a; Banerjee et al., 2005; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Goel & 
Nelson, 2009; Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006). 
                                                 
1
 “The article agrees with the enounced thesis and tries to provide an explanation of it that relates to the fact that 
in specific circumstances property-rights can produce distinct market failures that affect the social cost and can 
consequently prevent attainment of social welfare” (Ramello, 2011, p. 123). Even religious institutions with the 
supreme mission of spreading the Gospel have resorted to copyright for intellectual rents (Carla & Ramello, 
2011). “While property rules reduce transaction costs in the standard case of bilateral monopoly over the 
exchange of information goods, they might increase transaction costs” (Nicita & Ramello,  2007, p. 767). This 
evolution  may be in part be traceable to the phenomenon of ‘causal economic thinking’, highlighted by Fleury 
& Marciano (2013).  
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Recent studies on software piracy can be classified into four main strands, inter alia: 
nexuses with some factors, its determinants, surveys and others. First, the relationship 
between software piracy and the following have been investigated: socio-economic 
development (Banerjee, 2005); influences on software piracy (Bezmen & Depken, 2006);  
technological output (Charoensukmongkol & Elkassabgi, 2011); inequality (Asongu, 2014a; 
Andrés, 2016b); shadow economy (Goel & Nelson, 2012); taxation (Gomes et al., 2014a); 
intellectual rights protection (Hamister & Braunscheidel, 2013; Asongu, 2015a); scientific 
publications (Asongu, 2014b); implications for users and software companies (Jamil & Zaki, 
2011); economic wealth and natural culture (Moores, 2008; 2010); Kuznets curves either 
through per GDP (El Harbi et al., 2011) or extended to other determinants of industrialisation 
(Panas & Ninni, 2011); trade liberalisation and corruption (Robertson et al., 2008); per capita 
Gross National Income (Reinig & Plice, 2011) and the  decision to adopt a video game 
console (Goode & Kartas, 2012).  
Second, the determinants of software piracy in: the Far East countries (Chen et al., 
2010); worldwide (Gomes et al., 2013); European countries (Sonmez et al., 2010) as well as 
corrective measures (Theng et al., 2010). Third, surveys of: theoretical and empirical 
literature (Gomes et al., 2014b) and literature around the world (Kariithi, 2011). Fourth, a 
strand on varying other investigations:  major trends in software piracy over the past decade 
(Yang et al., 2013); comparative studies between Asian and Non-Asian industrialised 
economies (Ding & Liu, 2009) and   the use of new methods like neuro-computational models 
to assess if they outperform statistical techniques of a traditional dimension (Mostafa, 2011). 
In light of the above, there is scanty empirical literature on the effect of software on 
software piracy on economic growth (Asongu, 2013a, 2015a; Andrés & Asongu, 2013ab; 
Bezmen and Depken, 2004; Goel and Andrés, 2012).  Moreover, research on the influence of 
software piracy on an expanded conception of socioeconomic progress such as human 
development is clearly missing. Hence, the aim of this paper is to contribute to existing 
literature on software piracy by assessing the effect of software piracy on human development 
and its constituents at the macro level.  As far as we know, the rate of piracy can be seen more 
generally to proxy for piracy of other goods (books, sound recording, and motion pictures). In 
the process, we also examine which components of the inequality adjusted human 
development (IHDI) later in the investigated relationship.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides existing theory 
and empirical evidence. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in 
Section 3. The empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Theory and empirical evidence 
2.1 Piracy and development 
 In line with Bezmen & Depken (2004), there are two main avenues along which IP 
and the strength of IPRs regimes are thought to influence the level of economic growth and 
development. The first captures the extent to which IPRs influence the creation of new 
knowledge and information within individual nations, as well as the diffusion of existing 
knowledge across countries. The second is the indirect effect of a nation’s IPR regime on 
international transactions
2
 that provide factors imperative to the growth process.   
 
2.1.1 Creation and dissemination of information 
 IPRs protection could be traced to the foundation of endogenous theories of economic 
growth in which investment in research and development (R&D) results in profit (returns) to 
individual investors and also increases society’s stock of knowledge. By lowering the cost of 
future innovation, the accumulation of knowledge fosters economic growth (Romer, 1990; 
Grossman & Helpman, 1991). Fundamentally, the wisdom of tighter and more restrictive 
IPRs is premised on the notion that protection of IPRs serves as a stimulus to growth by 
encouraging innovations and inventions. It is only natural that individuals engage in 
innovative activities in response to expected payments for their efforts. As claimed by 
Bezmen & Depken (2004) from Baumol (1993), “this expectation is the primary motivation 
for entrepreneurial activity, increasing total factor productivity, and culminating in increased 
levels of output” (p. 5).  
 Patent holdings and R& D expenditures are more concentrated in the industrialized 
world and enforcement costs are positively associated with the tightening of IPRs. Hence 
stronger IPRs may increase gains (in the form of royalties) to developed countries (and the 
creators of technological advancements) at the expense of developing countries. In the same 
line of argumentation, some authors argue that net consumers of technological innovation 
have an incentive to enforce IPRs only when the innovation they consume differs from the 
type of innovation they supply to foreign markets (Diwan & Rodrick, 1991). It follows that 
the effectiveness of IPRs may be greatly dependent on the country’s present stage of 
development. Strict IPRs regimes may restrict diffusion of knowledge and technological 
                                                 
2
 For example international trade flows, technology transfers and foreign direct investment.  
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development in ‘technology followers’ while at the same time stimulating innovation in 
‘technology leaders’ (Bezmen & Depken, 2004).  
 Traditionally, industrialized nations have depended fairly heavily on the protection 
offered by IPRs. In contrast, less developed countries have often preferred rapid 
dissemination of knowledge at the cost of protecting the IPRs of foreigners. Recently, many 
newly industrialized countries have pushed for stronger IPRs through bilateral, multilateral 
and regional arrangements. This difference in approach might be attributed to the desire of 
developing countries to specialize in labor intensive production of agricultural industries. 
These industries until very recently have largely been supported by public expenditures on 
research and technology and have greatly benefited from shared knowledge spillovers. One 
application of this argument gaining widespread attention is the access to and affordability of 
life-saving drugs, especially with regard to the treatment of HIV/AIDS in developing 
countries. Immense pressure is being placed on pharmaceutical companies to ‘loosen’ their 
patent rights in order to allow poor countries the opportunity of better managing the AIDS 
pandemic.   
 
2.1.2 International effects 
Borrowing from Bezmen & Depken (2004), IPRs may also affect a nation’s growth 
and development process through their influence on a nation’s ability to engage in 
international transactions (e.g. trade, FDI flows and technology transfers). The potential 
growth rewards resulting from increased participation in international trade are well 
understood. It is generally accepted for instance that international trade can be an important 
stimulus to economic prosperity because access to world markets could spur greater 
utilization of idle human capital resources (Todaro & Smith, 2003). The endogenous growth 
theories argue that openness facilitates transmission of technology by providing contact with 
foreign counterparts and, directs domestic resources towards more research intensive sectors 
and increases market size knowledge (see Rivera Batiz & Romer, 1991). Nevertheless, these 
models do not necessarily predict that openness leads to economic growth for all countries 
and all circumstances. The theoretical prediction depends on country specific conditions.  A 
stronger IPRs regime may also prove to be a crucial factor in attracting inflows of FDI and 
technological transfers. More so, individual (investors and firms) perceptions regarding the 
strength of a nation’s IPRs regime positively affects such nations’ receipts of FDI and the 
willingness of foreigners to transfer newer technologies (Lee & Mansfield, 1996). Smith 
(2001) also finds a positive correlation between the sales of US affiliates and the strength of 
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intellectual property rights protection in a host country. Moreover some authors have argued 
that a weak system of IPRs protection deters FDI in high technology sectors where IPRs play 
a key role (Smarzynska, 2004). It has also been established that stronger IPRs have a positive 
incidence on a nation’s level of exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Smarzynska, 2004) and 
increases the likelihood of investment undertaken by multinational enterprises (Mansfield, 
1994; Seyoum, 1996). One the other hand, stronger IPRs protection could also reduce the 
need for FDI (Yang & Maskus, 2001).  
Like in the arguments in favor of lowered IPRs in certain pharmaceutical cases, access 
to productive computer software might have significant public good effects (Bezmen & 
Depken, 2004). As recently shown by Asongu (2014a, p. 526), software piracy could be good 
for the poor by mitigating inequality; hence positively contributing to inequality adjusted 
human development. Whether a piracy-instrumented
3
  impact on the IHDI and its constituents 
could yield similar trends remains an empirical question this paper seeks to address.  
 
2.2 Linkages between software piracy and inclusive development  
 
 In this section, we first discuss linkages between inclusive human development and 
software piracy before narrowing down the perspective to specific components of the 
inequality adjusted human development index, namely: income, literacy and life expectancy.  
 Asongu (2014a) has concluded that software piracy is good for the poor because it is 
associated with a positive income redistributive effect. According to the author, this linkage is 
fairly simple to understand because of the high cost of computer software in developing 
countries. Accordingly, a substantial bulk of the population within the low income category 
does not usually have the financial means to purchase original software. Therefore, 
counterfeiting, unauthorized downloading and illegal copying become more feasible options 
to possessing software. It follows that by using cheap software from pirated origins, money 
can be saved that would be subsequently used for other purposes. Hence, indulging in pirated 
products indirectly increases the purchasing power of the population in the low income strata. 
This narrative is also in accordance with Moores and Esichaikul (2011) who have found that 
economic wealth is negatively linked to software piracy, given that higher software piracy 
levels are more apparent in countries with lower economic wealth.  
 On the connection between literacy and software piracy, Asongu (2014b) has recently 
concluded that software piracy increases scientific publications. The author has recommended 
                                                 
3
 Using IPR laws (treaties) as instrumental variables.  
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less stringent property right regimes on software piracy (at least in the short run) in order to 
increase contribution to knowledge from low income countries. The positive nexus between 
software piracy and literacy builds on the intuition that more availability of usable computers 
by means of pirated software increases the diffusion of knowledge in society. This increased 
diffusion could be the result of the connection between the computers and other means of 
information and technology like mobile phones, the internet, inter alia.   
 The high cost of software has often been cited as the main factor motivating the use of 
pirated software. Hence, there is also a fundamental ethical dimension in the linkage between 
piracy and inclusive human development. Accordingly, citizens in poor nations are more 
likely to engage in piracy because they do not have the money to buy the ‘correct thing’. This 
narrative is consistent with the equity theory by Glass and Wood (1996) and empirical 
evidence from Douglas et al. (2007) which contend that individuals are less likely to use 
software of pirated origin if they view such usage to be unfair.  
 In the light of the above, it is reasonable to postulate that a state of income deprivation 
could induce fairness in the use of pirated software (Glass & Wood, 1996). Within this 
framework, constructs of equity used by Douglas et al. (2007) are traceable to concepts of 
pro-poor growth and income-inequality. Therefore, the saved income can be used to increase 
average income and other positive externalities associated with ‘increased income’ like living 
standards and life expectancy.  
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Measuring piracy 
Consistent with  previous empirical studies (Asongu (2015a) among others from SIIA 
(2000), software piracy is defined as “the unauthorized copying of computer software which 
constitutes copyright infringement for either commercial or personal use” (p.12). Due to 
software piracy potentially taking place in many avenues – e.g., organized copiers, piracy by 
individuals and commercial or business piracy– obtaining an accurate measure of the 
prevalence of software piracy remains a challenge. There are many types of piracy. According 
to the Business Software Alliance (BSA), we can distinguish among: 1) end user copying; 2) 
downloading; and 3) counterfeiting. The level of piracy is computed as the difference in 
demand for new software applications (estimated from PC shipments) and the legal supply of 
software.  In our paper, the measure of piracy employed is the percentage of software 
9 
 
(primarily business software) in a country that is illegally installed (without a license) 
annually and is taken to capture the level of software piracy. This variable is reported in 
percentages, ranging from zero % (no piracy) to 100 % (i.e., all software installed is pirated). 
Piracy rates are obtained from the Business Software Alliance, (BSA), (2007), (refer to 
Business Software Alliance (2009) for measurement details).
4
  BSA is an industry group; 
nevertheless its data on software piracy, is the best cross-country measure currently available, 
though subject to some inherent upward bias.
5
  The data on software piracy may be seen more 
broadly as proxying for the extent of digital piracy.  The mean level of piracy rate in the 
sample was 60.5 percent, with the minimum piracy rate of 21 percent and a maximum piracy 
rate of 94.3 percent. 
Borrowing from recent African development literature (Asongu, 2013b), the paper 
uses the HDI (adjusted for inequality) as a proxy for human development. In a bid to obtain 
more robust results and capture specific human development channels of piracy, the IHDI is 
decomposed into its constituents of literacy; life expectancy and per capita economic 
prosperity. Therefore four endogenous variables will be used in the analysis. These indicators 
are from the World Bank Development (WBD) Indicators. It should be noted that while the 
IHDI was first published in 2010; the algorithm for its calculation has been used to adjust 
historical data up to the year 1970.  
The human development index shows the national average of achievements in three 
principal areas: health and long life, knowledge and decent standards of living. The inequality 
adjusted human development index does not only control for the average level of 
achievements with respect to health, education and income, but it also accounts for the 
manner in which the distribution of these achievements are realized among the population by 
computing the average value with regard to its inequality level.  
 Control variables are obtained from recent inclusive human development literature, 
namely: (i) GDP per capita growth, private domestic credit, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and remittances (from Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a) and (ii) mobile phones, government 
expenditure, trade openness and secondary school enrolment (Asongu et al., 2015). To these 
variables we add foreign aid, health expenditure and political stability in order to further 
control for ‘variable omission bias’ in specific components of the human development index.  
                                                 
4
  The BSA data primarily measures the piracy of commercial software.  We are unaware of any publicly 
available cross-national data on end-user software piracy.  See Png (2010) for a discussion about the reliability 
of piracy data. Also see Traphagan & Griffith (1998). 
5
  Among the many researchers that have used this data are Andrés (2006a), Banerjee et al. (2005), Goel & 
Nelson (2009) and Marron & Steel (2000). 
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GDP per capita growth, health expenditure and secondary school enrolments are used in the 
distinct specifications of the IHDI, life expectancy and literacy. For the most part, we 
anticipate positive nexuses between selected covariates and inclusive human development as 
in recent inclusive growth literature (Anand et al., 2012; Mishra et al., 2011; Seneviratne & 
Sun, 2013; Mlachila et al., 2014). Accordingly, credit facilities, FDI, trade and health 
expenditure are required for social spending that improve human development (see Mlachila 
et al., 2014) and remittances which have been documented to be used substantially for 
consumption purposes (see Mlachila et al., 2014; Ssozi & Asongu, 2015) are very likely to 
enhance human development. It is also important to note that some of the covariates (e.g. 
foreign aid and health expenditure) can also negatively affect the inclusive outcomes because 
their allocation may be associated with corruption and mismanagement. Whereas Asongu 
(2014c) has recently shown that foreign aid is perilous to inclusive human development, 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) have clarified the findings by establishing that the effect 
could both be positive and negative, contingent on specifications and types of aid.  
Due to constraints in data availability, the data include a panel of annual observations 
from 11 African countries for the years 2000-2010. The sample is limited because the 
software piracy data is only available for this number of countries on annual basis. Details 
about the variable definitions and data sources (Appendix 1), summary statistics with 
presentation of countries (Appendix 2) and correlation analysis showing the basic correlations 
between key variables used in this paper (Appendix 3) are presented in the appendices. From 
the summary statistics, it is apparent that the variables are comparable. Moreover the 
substantial degree of variation from corresponding standard deviations is an indication that 
reasonable estimated relationships should be anticipated. The purpose of the correlation 
matrix is to control for concerns in multicollinearity. From a preliminary assessment, such 
issues are apparent between political stability, government effectiveness and trade openness. 
Hence, we do not employ all three variables in the same specification.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
 While piracy could be exogenous to human development, the reverse effect cannot be 
ruled-out, as human development engenders more respect for IPRs. As sustained by Bezmen 
& Depken (2004), studies investigating the piracy-development nexus are subject to potential 
endogeneity problems, because it is likely that a nation’s level of development is a crucial 
factor in its choice of or adherence to a particular IPR regime. This confirms an earlier study 
by Ginarte & Park (1997) who found strong evidence that the level of economic development 
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explains the strength of patent protection provided by individual countries. We are therefore 
confronted here with an issue of endogeneity owing to reverse-causality since the piracy 
indicators are correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. Beside the reverse-
causality,  the human development indicator (adjusted for inequality) is subject to omitted 
variables that also cause endogeneity. The HDI consists of three components: life expectancy, 
income and literacy. However we know from reality that human development is a 
multidimensional and complex phenomenon, with quantitative and qualitative aspects. To 
tackle this endogeneity concern, we instrument the independent variable of interest (or 
software piracy) with their first lags.  
 In accordance with recent inclusive human development literature (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a) we adopt fixed effects (FE) and Tobit regressions in order to 
respectively control for the unobserved heterogeneity and limited range in the dependent 
variables. Therefore, instrumental variable (IV) FE and Tobit estimations are used. Contrary 
to the underlying study that has also employed the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
to control for persistence in inclusive human development, we cannot employ the GMM 
because T(11)=N(11). It is important to note that a basic requirement for the application of 
GMM is T<N.  
 Software piracy is instrumented in Eq. (1).  
  titijti SPSP ,1,,                                                                         (1) 
Where: tiSP , , is the software piracy indicator of country i  
at  period t ,  while 1, tiSP  
denotes 
software piracy indicator of country i
 
at  period 1t ,  ,  is a constant, ti ,  the error term.  
 The panel FE model is presented as follows in Eq. (2) 
tiitih
h
htiti WIVSPIHD ,,,
9
1
,10,    

          (2) 
Where: tiIHD ,  
is inclusive human development of country i
 
at  period t ;  is a constant;
 
IVSP, instrumented software piracy; W  is the vector of control variables  (domestic credit, 
mobile phones, political stability, GDP per capita growth, remittances, foreign investment, 
secondary school enrolment, foreign aid and health expenditure  );
 i

 
is the country-specific 
effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 Given that the range of the IHDI is theoretically between 0 and 1 (0.374 to 0.748), 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) may be inappropriate. Tobit models have been employed in the 
literature in order to control for such limited range in the dependent variable (Kumbhakar & 
Lovell, 2000; Koetter et al., 2008; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Ariss, 2010).  Consistent 
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with McDonald (2009) and Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010), if there are no observations of 
either 0 or 1 for the IHDI (which is the case here), estimating by a double-censored Tobit 
model is the same as estimating by a linear regressions model since the two likelihood 
functions coincide. Therefore, the logistic regression associated with the Tobit model is as 
follows:  
 
  itit
it
it
x
x
IHD 





'
'
exp1
exp
                                                                                         (3)
 
where itx  is the same vector of regressors used in the Tobit model,   is the vector of 
parameters  and it is  independently and identically distributed (iid) with mean zero and 
variance ² variance.  
 
The standard Tobit model (Tobin, 1958; Carsun & Sun, 2007) is as follows: 
 
                                                         tititi Xy ,,0
*
,      (4) 
 
where *,tiy is a latent response variable, tiX ,  
is an observed k1
 
vector of explanatory 
variables  and ti,  
i.i.d. N(0, σ2) and is independent variable  of tiX , . Instead of observing 
*
,tiy , we observe tiy , :   
                                                          
,,0
*
,
*
,
*
,,
,








ti
titi
ti
y
y
if
ify
y
 
     (5) 
 
where  is a non stochastic constant. In other words, the value of *,tiy is missing when it is less 
than or equal to   . 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Presentation of results  
  Table 1 presents IV FE for inclusive human development and its components. Two 
main specifications are used for each dependent variable: the first with limited conditioning 
information set and the second with a broader conditioning information set. Moreover, some 
covariates in the conditioning information set are tailored to specific dependent variables. For 
example, GDP per capita growth is used for the IHDI, health expenditure for life expectancy 
and secondary school enrolment for literacy.  
 The following can be established. First, software piracy consistently improves the 
IHDI and its constituents. It follows that the positive relationship between inclusive human 
development and software piracy is driven by all its constituents. Second, with the exception 
of political stability, most of the significant control variables have expected signs. As recently 
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shown by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016c) in the prediction of the Arab Spring, the political 
stability variable is negatively skewed in African countries. Hence, a negatively-skewed 
oriented political stability variable can have a negative effect on inclusive human 
development.  
 
Table 1: Instrumental Variable Panel Fixed Effects  
         
 Inclusive development Income (log) Life Expectancy  (log) Literacy rate (log) 
 IHDI IHDI GDPp GDPp LifeExp.  LifeExp. Literacy Literacy 
Constant  1.014*** 1.014*** 3.475*** 3.469*** 1.748*** 1.754*** 1.758*** 1.637*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Piracy IV 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.004** 0.003* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.028) (0.050) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.016) (0.588) 
Domestic credit 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0004 0.0004* -0.0001 -0.0001* 0.001*** 0.0003 
 (0.255) (0.060) (0.138) (0.083) (0.249) (0.091) (0.000) (0.167) 
Mobile phones 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.0009*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.00008 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.339) (0.120) 
Political Stability -0.002 -0.0006 -0.016 -0.021* -0.006 -0.014*** -0.016 0.003 
 (0.608) (0.889) (0.183) (0.079) (0.193) (0.002) (0.151) (0.743) 
GDPpcg  --- 0.0009*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.002)       
Remittances  --- 0.001*** --- 0.002** --- 0.0008** --- 0.003*** 
  (0.002)  (0.018)  (0.033)  (0.001) 
Foreign Investment --- 0.000 --- 0.002** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.978)  (0.046)     
Education (SSE) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002*** 
        (0.000) 
Foreign Aid --- --- --- -0.001* --- -0.001*** --- -0.001* 
    (0.062)  (0.000)  (0.099) 
Health Expenditure --- --- --- --- --- -0.0008 --- --- 
      (0.443)   
         
Adjusted  R²(within) 0.849 0.884 0.729 0.780 0.473 0.614 0.404 0.692 
Fisher  106.99*** 78.51*** 56.72*** 40.54*** 16.40*** 15.72*** 12.89*** 15.45*** 
Countries  11 11 11 11 11 11 10 9 
Observations  91 90 99 98 88 87 90 64 
         
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPpcg: Gross Domestic Product Per Capital Growth Rata. 
LifeExp: Life Expectancy. Literacy: Adult literacy rate. GDPpc: Gross Domestic Product per capita. SSE: Secondary School 
Enrolment.  G: Government. IV: Instrumental Variable.  
 
 In Table 2 on IV Tobit regressions, the positive relationship between software piracy 
and inclusive human development is confirmed exclusively in IHDI and literacy regressions. 
The negative effect of software piracy on GDP per capita is not consistent across 
specifications while that on life expectancy is consistent across specifications. It follows from 
the findings that the positive relationship between software piracy and inclusive human is 
driven fundamentally by the literacy rate. Most of the significant control variables display 
expected signs. The negative relationship between health expenditure and life expectancy may 
be traceable to corruption and mismanagement of such health expenditure.  
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Table 2: Instrumental Variable Panel Tobit Model 
         
 Inclusive development Income (log) Life Expectancy  (log) Literacy rate (log) 
 IHDI IHDI GDPp GDPp LifeExp.  LifeExp. Literacy Literacy 
Constant  -3.058* -3.539* 3.467*** 3.764*** 1.767*** 1.940*** 1.781*** 1.731*** 
 (0.066) (0.080) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Piracy IV 0.548 0.700* -0.044** -0.018 -0.015** -0.007* 0.003 0.012** 
 (0.149) (0.071) (0.049) (0.258) (0.015) (0.092) (0.614) (0.013) 
Domestic credit 0.118*** 0.144*** 0.001 0.00009 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0006** 0.0003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.247) (0.901) (0.285) (0.469) (0.038) (0.141) 
Mobile phones -0.038** -0.042** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.0009*** 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (0.036) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.137) (0.680) 
Political Stability -0.207 -1.004 0.123*** 0.169*** -0.015 0.015** 0.038*** 0.011 
 (0.693) (0.101) (0.000) (0.000) (0.107) (0.035) (0.000) (0.145) 
GDPpcg  --- -0.137 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.518)       
Remittances  --- -0.328** --- -0.011** --- 0.004*** --- -0.010*** 
  (0.011)  (0.032)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Foreign Investment --- 0.181 --- 0.002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.341)  (0.737)     
Education (SSE) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001*** 
        (0.000) 
Foreign Aid --- --- --- -0.051*** --- -0.006*** --- -0.005** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.048) 
Health Expenditure --- --- --- --- --- -0.032*** --- --- 
      (0.000)   
         
LR Chi-Square  23.81*** 31.02*** 72.97*** 148.81**** 19.19*** 88.28*** 33.38*** 107.48*** 
Pseudo R² 0.044 0.058 0.843 1.759 -0.100 -0.461 -0.211 -1.061 
Log Likelihood -256.104 -250.011 -6.780 32.110 105.324 139.794 95.506 104.3772 
Observations  91 90 99 98 88 87 90 64 
         
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. *, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
GDPpcg: Gross Domestic Product Per Capital Growth Rata. LifeExp: Life Expectancy. Literacy: Adult literacy rate. GDPpc: 
Gross Domestic Product per capita. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment.  G: Government. IV: Instrumental Variable.  
 
 
4.2.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications  
 We discuss the: (i) positive relationship between software piracy and inclusive 
development; (ii) fact that the established relationship could be driven for the most part by the 
literacy rate and (iii) conflicting findings on the role of piracy on life expectancy.  
 First, the positive nexus between software piracy and inclusive human development is 
consistent with Asongu (2014a) who has established software piracy to be good for the poor. 
Software piracy may be inclusive because of the high cost of computer software. Hence, the 
population within the lower income echelons of society may not afford to purchase original 
packages of software. Therefore, resorting to counterfeiting, unauthorized downloading and 
illegal copying could be the feasible alternative to saving income for other expenses in basic 
needs, health and education. A direct result of such savings is an increase in purchasing 
power. This interpretation accords with Moores and Esichaikul, (2011, pp. 1-2) who have 
established that there is a negative nexus between economic wealth and software piracy, such 
that countries with higher income are comparatively less linked to software piracy. It is 
therefore not surprising that the same authors have documented that the high cost of software 
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motivates resort to software piracy. When the assumption is translated from a macroeconomic 
perspective to a microeconomic view, it becomes apparent that the poor stand to benefit more 
from software piracy because when compared with the rich, the corresponding saved-income 
is comparatively higher relative to their total household income.  
 Considering the African-specific context of the inquiry, it is important to elicit the 
cultural dimension of the relationship. In essence, culture can play a fundamental role in the 
established relationship because software piracy tend to be more prevalent in collectivist 
societies (Moores & Esichaikul, 2011, p. 2) and such collectivism is more likely to be 
apparent among the poor compared to among the rich. Therefore, it is only natural that 
software piracy engenders higher inclusiveness in human development. In the light of these 
narratives, our findings are in line with the substantial bulk of literature that has focused on 
examining the determining factors behind software piracy. This includes literature that is 
consistent with the position that lower rates of software piracy are associated with greater 
individualism (see Rushing &  Thompson, 1996, 1999; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Maskus &  
Penubarti, 1995;Park & Ginarte, 1997; Marron &  Steel, 2000; Husted, 2000; Depken &  
Simmons, 2004; Kim, 2004; Kranenburg &  Hogenbirk, 2003).  
 Within a broader framework of the literature, our results contribute to the debate on 
levels of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. Notably, it is consistent with the stream 
of literature documenting that very stringent IPRs could limit growth and inclusive 
development prospects in poor countries (Yang & Maskus, 2001), thus counteracting the 
strand of literature with the position that higher levels of IPRs protection stimulates factor 
productivity and development (Falvey et al., 2006; Gould & Gruben, 1996). Our findings 
conform to the first school in the perspective that, less stringent IPRs are essential (at least in 
the short-term) for poor countries in order to enable spillovers in knowledge that are essential 
for economic growth and inclusive development. Hence, the results reconcile both schools on 
the view that less stringent IPRs regimes are imperative at least in the short-run in less 
developed countries in order to boost knowledge spillovers. Conversely, as inclusiveness 
increases and sampled countries begin to experience higher levels in the IHDI, the adoption of 
more stringent IPR regimes would increase the probability of investment from multinationals 
(Seyoum, 1996; Mansfield, 1994); facilitate exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) and ease 
technological transfers (Lee & Mansfield, 1996).  
 The fact that the positive relationship between software piracy and inclusive human 
development could be driven by the literacy rate is broadly in accordance with Asongu 
(2014b) who has concluded that software piracy boosts scientific publications in Africa. 
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Among components of the IHDI, the role of literacy as the principal driving factor 
fundamentally builds on the fact the software is intrinsically linked to other instruments of 
knowledge diffusion like mobile phones, personal computers and internet penetration. This is 
consistent with the bulk of literature on the positive role of information and communication 
technologies in the diffusion of knowledge for economic wellbeing and inclusive 
development (Ureta, 2008; Smith & Seward, 2009; Sen, 2010; Asongu, 2015b; Kwan & Chiu, 
2015). 
 Third, the conflicting nature of the effect of software piracy on life expectancy to some 
extend aptly translates the debate on the role of IPRs on health and pharmaceutical products. 
A case in point is the debate on HIV/AIDS drugs which is a fundamental cause of mortality in 
the sampled countries. In essence, the high cost of these drugs is motivating some proponents 
to advocate for less tight IPRs and so that  ‘permission’ should be granted to enable ‘copying’ 
the life-saving pharmaceuticals; especially those used in the management of HIV/AIDS in 
developing countries most affected and least likely to afford such treatments. The thesis of 
these proponents is premised on the reality that existing technology in African countries is 
more imitative and adaptive in nature, rather than suitable for creation of new innovations.  
 
5. Conclusion and further research directions 
The study examines the effect of software piracy on inclusive human development in 11 
African countries for which software piracy data is available for the period 2000-2010. The 
empirical evidence is based on instrumental variable panel Fixed Effects (FE) and Tobit 
models in order to control for the unobserved heterogeneity and limited range in the 
dependent variable. The modeling exercise is based on the inequality adjusted human 
development (IHDI) and its constituents. The following main findings are established.  First, 
from the FE regressions, software piracy consistently improves the IHDI and its constituents. 
Within this framework, the positive relationship between inclusive human development and 
software piracy is driven by all its constituents.  Second, for Tobit regressions,  the positive 
relationship between software piracy and inclusive human development is confirmed 
exclusively in IHDI and literacy specifications. Within the latter framework, the positive 
relationship between software piracy and inclusive human is driven fundamentally by the 
literacy rate. Policy implications have been discussed.  
 It is also important to acknowledge that ethical concerns may  surround the established 
relationship, notably: (i) the seller of software that is pirated could think that he/she has the 
right to continue doing his/her business because the company incurs more expenses in taking 
17 
 
the matter to court; (ii) users of pirated software could also think it is fair to use pirated 
software because they are poor and cannot afford the high cost of purchasing the ‘correct 
thing’; (iii) illegal copying could derive from interpersonal trust because those who either 
share or copy software with others have some degree of trust that such software is not 
contaminated with viruses and (iv) individuals that engage in the distribution of pirated 
software must also trust that persons to whom they are distributed are unlikely to report to the 
police.  
  Future inquiries can improve extant literature by assessing the established linkages 
throughout the conditional distribution of inclusive human development. This is essentially 
because the established relationships may differ across countries with low, intermediate and 
high initial levels of inclusive human development.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables Signs Definitions of variables  Sources 
    
Human Development   IHDI Inequality adjusted Human Development Index World Bank(WDI) 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpc Log of GDPpc, PPP(International constant dollar 2005) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Life Expectancy  LifeExp Log of Life Expectancy at birth(Total years) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Literacy Rate Literacy Log Adult literacy rate(annual % of population aged 
15+) 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
Piracy  Piracy  Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Piracy (IV) PiracyIV Instrumented Piracy rate  Authors’ calculation 
    
Mobile phone Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people)  
    
Political Stability PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism”. 
 
World Bank(WGI) 
    
Government Effectiveness  Gov.E “Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies” 
 
World Bank(WGI) 
    
GDP per capita growth GDPpcg GDP per capita growth (% of annual)  
    
 Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
FDSD 
    
Remittances  Remit Remittance inflows (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Foreign Investment  FDI Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Education SSE Secondary School Enrolment (% of Gross) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Foreign  Aid Aid Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Trade Openness  Trade Imports plus Exports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Health Expenses  HealthExp Health Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. BSA: Business Software Alliance. 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Log: Logarithm. PPP: Purchasing Power Parity. WGI: World Governance Indicators.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean  S.D  Min Max Obser. 
 
Dependent 
Variables  
Human Development  0.547 0.113 0.376 0.748 113 
GDP per capita (log) 3.543 0.362 3.012 4.106 121 
Life Expectancy (log) 1.758 0.076 1.622 1.862 110 
Literacy ratio (log) 1.826 0.097 1.572 1.956 110 
       
 
 
Independent 
& Control 
Variables  
Piracy  2.745 1.857 0.000 5.250 121 
Piracy IV 2.932 1.522 0.749 4.989 110 
Private domestic credit  38.221 36.917 0.010 149.775 121 
Mobile phone penetration  34.649 30.437 0.024 117.761 121 
Political stability  -0.382 0.840 -2.084 1.069 110 
Government effectiveness  -0.164 0.583 -1.038 0.804 100 
GDP per capita growth 2.452 2.189 -5.069 7.967 121 
Remittances  3.286 3.482 0.006 13.042 118 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows 2.851 2.685 -1.156 12.013 121 
Secondary School Enrolment  59.980 24.320 16.468 95.699 90 
Foreign-aid  3.572 4.844 -0.251 24.424 121 
Trade  70.038 19.711 39.017 134.522 120 
 Health Expenditure  5.561 1.437 3.489 10.251 110 
       
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt,  Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia 
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix 
                  
Dependent variables Independent variables Control variables  
IHDI GDPp LifeExp. Literacy Piracy PiracyIV Pcrbof Mobile PolS Gov.E GDPpcg Remit FDI SSE Aid Trade HealthExp  
1.000 0.106 -0.152 0.161 -0.219 -0.173 0.484 -0.043 -0.020 0.168 -0.006 -0.149 -0.095 0.168 -0.104 -0.084 0.358 IHDI 
 1.000 0.158 0.816 -0.198 -0.168 0.278 0.448 0.543 0.741 0.272 -0.599 0.424 0.899 -0.677 0.614 0.261 GDPp 
  1.000 -0.054 -0.490 -0.353 0.535 0.256 -0.245 -0.017 0.229 0.270 -0.466 0.367 -0.372 0.332 -0.543 LifeExp. 
   1.000 -0.035 -0.079 0.169 0.289 0.429 0.460 0.088 -0.868 0.230 0.784 -0.640 0.447 0.179 Literacy  
    1.000 0.749 -0.679 -0.094 -0.147 -0.335 -0.144 -0.116 0.055 -0.264 0.287 -0.342 0.139 Piracy 
     1.000 -0.475 0.138 -0.0008 -0.201 -0.314 0.005 -0.020 -0.211 0.251 -0.142 0.232 PiracyIV 
      1.000 0.352 0.272 0.454 0.181 0.101 -0.228 0.370 -0.349 0.456 0.031 Pcrbof 
       1.000 0.389 0.429 -0.075 -0.145 0.253 0.405 -0.254 0.543 0.300 Mobile 
        1.000 0.880 0.026 -0.242 0.488 0.261 -0.078 0.695 0.432 PolS 
         1.000 0.201 -0.229 0.493 0.513 -0.248 0.747 0.442 Gov.E 
          1.000 0.026 0.249 0.209 -0.311 0.179 -0.314 GDPpcg 
           1.000 -0.210 -0.576 0.437 -0.191 -0.184 Remit 
            1.000 0.197 -0.108 0.130 0.531 FDI 
             1.000 -0.728 0.467 0.163 SSE 
              1.000 -0.271 0.068 Aid 
               1.000 -0.064 Trade 
                1.000 HealthExp 
                  
IHDI : Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. GDPp: GDP per capita. LifeExp: Life Expectancy. Literacy: Literacy Rate. Piracy: Piracy rate. PiracyIV: Instrumented Piracy rate. Pcrbof: Private Domestic 
credit. Mobile: Mobile phone penetration.  PolS: Political Stability. Gov.E: Government Effectiveness. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Remit: Remittances. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. SSE: Secondary School 
Enrolment. Aid: Foreign Aid. Trade: Trade Openness. HealthExp: Health Expenditure.  
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